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If a merchant, by false and fraudulent statements, made to a commer-
cial agency, obtain a rating of credit to which he is not entitled, in order
to induce a wholesale dealer to intrust him with a correspondingly large
bill of goods, this circumstance may be given in evidence against him as
a badge of fraud; and such wholesale dealer may show that he acted
upon the information thus obtained, and was thereby induced, in good
faith, and as a business man of ordinary prudence, to part with his
goods.
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Commercial agencies are well-known instruments of com-
merce, in many things essential to the transaction of the com-
mercial business of to-day. They " have become vast and
extensive factors in modern commercial transactions for fur-
nishing information," said the Appellate Court of Indiana,
" to retail dealers and jobbers as well as to wholesale mer-
chants. The courts are bound to know judicially that no
1 Reported, I Ind. App. 573.
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vendor of goods at wholesale can be regarded as a prudent
business man if he sells to a retail dealer, upon a credit with-
out first informing himself through these mediums of inform-
ation of the financial standing of the customer, and the credit
to which he is fairly entitled:" Furry v. O'Conner, I Ind.
App. 573; S. C., 28 N. E. Rep. 1O3; Eaton v. Avery, 83
N. Y. 31 ; S. C., 7 Am. Rep. 389; Holmes v. Harington,
20 Mo. App. 661.
Sec. 2. Contracting Against Liability for Negligence.
The general rule, undoubtedly, is that a person may not
escape liability for his own negligence by a stipulation to that
effect. Such a contract is contrary to public policy. But
this rule does not apply in its full force to Mercantile
Agencies in gathering information and disseminating it among
its customers and patrons. The methods of such agencies are
well known, and need not here be specified nor stated. It is
customary for them to contract against the negligence of their
own agents in the gathering of information, and usually the
contract, with their patrons provides that such agents shall
be considered the agents of the patrons. In a contract of this
character it was contended that it was a' contract against
gross negligence only, and not against ordinary negligence,
but the court thought differently. " By the contract," said
the court, "the plaintiffs expressly agreed to take the risk of
such loss upon themselves. The authorities, to which we
have been referred, have, in our judgment, no application to
the case. Common carriers, innkeepers and others, engaged
in the exercise of a public calling, cannot thus protect them-
selves against the consequences of gross negligence in the
agents whom they employ. This limitation of the right to
contract, as parties may choose, is an exception from the gen-
eral rule and confined to the class of cases named, when the
public interests are supposed to demand its application. It
has no place here. The contract which these parties entered
into must be enforced as they made it. It may have been
unwise, but with that we have nothing to do. One or the
other must bear the risk involved in depending upon agents
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scattered over -he country, of whom neither could know
much. The plaintiffs agreed to bear it, and they must take
the consequence:" Duncan v. Dunn, 9 Cent. L. Jr. 15I;
S. C., 7 W. N. C. 246; 8 Rep. 299; Crew v. Bradstrect
Co., 6 Pa. Co. Ct. 36o: Dunm v. uyioNational .Bank, 58 Fed.
Rep. I74; S. C., 7C. C. A. 152,(reversing 5I Fed. Rep. i6o).
When the plaintiff, as a member of such an agency,
inquired concerning one B, "grocer, 63 Grand Avenue, Detroit,
Mich.," and the agency reported concerning one B, "grocer
and saloonkeeper, 573 Russel, corner Ohio, Detroit, Mich. ;"
and the plaintiff, without further inquiry, filled an order for 63
Grand Avenue; and the plantiff sued the agency, the goods
never having been paid for, alleging that the defendant did
not make proper inquiry of the agent at Detroit. but there
was no evidence in support of the allegation; it was held that
the evidence did not show the defendant guilty of such gross
negligence as rendered it liable for the goods: Xiques v.
Bradstreet Co., 70 Hun. 334; S. C., 24 N. Y. Supp. 48; 53
N. Y. St. Rep. 814.
But a contract, however, against the negligence of such
agents does not protect the agency from an error made in the
publication of its books of reference giving the financial respon-
sibility of merchants and others, and upon which a subscriber
of the agency relied in selling goods and suffered a loss. In
such a case it is not necessary to sue the purchaser of the
goods and to thus establish his insolvency before suing the
agency: Crew v. Bradsreet, 134 Pa. 161; S. C., 19 Atl. Rep.
500; 25 W. N. C. 538; 6 Pa. C. C. 36o.
Sec. 3. Liability as Affected by the Statute of Frauds.
Whether or not the liability of the agency for false repre-
sentations is affected by the statute of frauds, is a question not
settled. It has been held that a false statement concerning
the financial ability of a merchant, not made in writing, and of
course unsigned, bound the agency; on the ground that it
could not violate its original contract made in writing with its
patrons to furnish accurate statements concerning such per-
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sons as inquiry should be made: Spraguwe v. Dunn, I2
Phil. 3 10.
Another view of the question is that the action is not upon
the representations but upon the contract, and no statute
requires that to be in writing. Vhichever view is taken, it
results in holding the company liable: M]7cLean v. Dunn, U. C.
39 Q. B. 551-
This last case was very much shaken on appeal, and while
the case was reversed on other points, there is a strong
dictum that the decision on this point in the lower courts was
erroneous: OfeLcan v. Dunn, I Ont. App. 153.
Sec. /. Liability as a Collction Agency.
If a commercial agency undertakes to colleet a claim, it is
responsible the same as an attorney, unless the contract to
collect limits its liability: Bradstrcet v. Evcrson, 72 Pa. 124;
S. C., 13 Am. Rep. 665.
Sec. 5. P-i7'icglcd Communications.
As early as 1826 an English society formed for " the pro-
tection of trade against swindlers and sharpers," into which all
fair traders were admissable, reported to its members that a
certain person was deemed an improper person to be balloted
for as a member. It was the duty of the society through the
secretary to make this report. The person who was thus
singled out brought suit for lioel, and Lord Tenterden
instructed the jury that the communication was libelous
beyond a doubt, and the jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff:
Goldstcin v. Foss, 2 C. & P. 252 ; S. C., 12 E. C. L. 556.
In 1848 arose a case more nearly akin to the subject here
discussed. The appellants were directors in a Scottish mer-
cantile society, formed " to concentrate and bring together,
from time to time, a body of information for the exclusive use
of the members, relating to mercantile credit of the trading
community, with a view of diminishing the hazards to which
mercantile men are exposed." The rules of the society
required its secretary to collect from the public records of
protests the names and designations of debtors in trade, to
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print this information and forward it monthly to each member
of the society. The respondent had dishonored two notes,
and procured an interdict against the publication of the probate
by the appellants. The laws of Scotland required all protests
to be recorded in a public register, and it was conceded that
the extracts complained of were taken from the record and
were made for a limited purpose and for the use of the society.
The House of Lords dismissed the interdict on the ground
that the act was a perfectly lawful one,-the publication of a
public record, by law required to be kept: Flemming v. X -
ton, i N. L. Cas. 363.
In 1855 arose an early case in this country. The plaintiff
was a merchant and the defendant the proprietor of a mer-
cantile agency. The defendant had received, on what was
supposed to be reliable authority, a report injurious to the
credit of the plaintiff. This report had been read by defend-
ant's agency, who were interested in knowing the plaintiff's
financial standing. The report was not correct and was
unjust. The court instructed the jury that if the defendant,
or the constituted agent of a commercial house, upon the
application of his principal, made inquiries at the proper place
and under proper and reasonable grounds to insure accuracy
and privacy concerning the information thus obtained, and the
information which he thus obtained was reported bonafide to
his employer, and to him alone, as the result of such inquiries,
and for the purpose of governing his conduct in his business
transactions with the party concerning whom the inquiry was
made, such communication might be justifiable, as a confi-
dential communication, and the defendant would not be
responsible, although the information was incorrect and
unfounded in fact, the defendant acting in good faith, and
believing it to be true at the time he communicated it: but
that the privilege of a confidential agent would be confined to
the agent, and if the principal repeated it to others, he would
be responsible: Billings v. Russel, 8 Boston Law Rep. 699.
The leading case in this country was decided in i851 and
affirmed in 1853. The defendant:: had a commercial agency
in New York, and printed on sheets, and afterwards in a
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book, a report on a business house in Columbia, Miss., of
which the plaintiff was a member. After giving an unfavor-
able report of the business of the firm, the report said the
plaintiff, Taylor, was an unprincipled character. The sheets
and books were distributed among members of the society,
some of whom were interested, but most of them were not.
Taylor sued the defendants for libel, and the defence was that
the communications were privileged. The court denied the
soundness of the defence, on the ground that they were
furnished to persons having no present interest in the reports,
and by persons having no other interest in furnishing it than
to gain a profit thereby. " No case," said the court, " that
has been cited protects a communication made for the mcre
purpose of profit, and to persons having at the time no interest
in knowing it. Nor can such a rule be maintained upon
principle. The only ground of privileged communication is
interest, either in the party having or receiving the informa-
tion ; but it is not to be found in a case where no such interest
exists at the time the communication is made. Any extension
of the rule would be fraught with danger to that class of
business men to whom credit is of any value": Taylor v.
Church, I E. D. Smith, 279.
On appeal the decision was made to rest solely on the
ground that the information claimed to be libelous was com-
municated to persons other than those who had a direct and
a special interest in it, and is an authority for nothing beyond:
Taylor v. Churck, 8 N. Y. 482.
In 1868 arose the second case in New York, and the case
next in point of time. The defendant was the owner of a
mercantile agency. By the terms of the subscription to the
agency which constituted the contract between the defendant
and the persons to whom the alleged slanderous words were
uttered, all information was to be considered strictly con-
fidential, and furnished only for the use of subscribers. A
subscriber, holding a note endorsed by the plaintiff, applied
to the defendant for information concerning such indorser's
credit and responsibility. The books of the agency were
consulted by its clerk, and the result communicated by the
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proprietor to the subscriber, to the effect that the indorser was
a "man of no responsibility, he was a bad man and worked
for counterfeiters, and was a counterfeiter," This communica-
tion was held privileged, the words having been communicated
by the defendant in the performance of a duty imposed upon
him, to a person who had an interest in the matter, and who
had a right to require its information. The decision follows
the rule laid down in Toogood v. Spryling, I Comp. M. & R.
143, to the effect that a communication is privileged, if fairly
made by a person in the discharge of some public or private
duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own
affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned. Ormnsby v.
Douglass, 37 N. Y. 477.
The next case in point of time, we believe, is a Pennsyl-
vania case. There an agency had sent to all its subscribers a
"notification sheet," containing the names of persons whose
commercial ratings should be changed from those given in a
book previously furnished. The sheet gave no particulars,
but instructed subscribers who were specially interested to
call at the office of the agency for information. The court
held the communication not privileged, saying: " There is no
great hardship imposed on an agency of this kind, if they are
required to know beforehand that their statements are true,
and that the person to whom they are sent has an interest in
receiving information :" Comnmonwealth v. Stacey, 8 Phil. 617;
S. C., 3 Phil. Leg. Gaz. 13.
Thus far, we have pursued near the order in which cases
have been decided. It is no longer necessary or feasible to do
so. In the last quarter of a century the cases have rapidly
increased upon the question of privilege. One of the lead-
ing cases is Sunderlin -'. Bradslrect, 46 N. Y. 188 ; S. C., 7
Am. Rep. 322. In that case the defendant distributed ten
thousand copies of a publication giving the standing of mer-
chants. He also issued "weekly statements" containing cor-
rections, in one of which it was stated that the plaintiff .had
failed. It was held that the commnunicationt was not privileged.
"In the case at bar." saiI the court. " it is not pretended that
but few, if any, of the persons to whom the ten thousand
COMMERCIAL AGENCIES.
copies of the libelous publications were transmitted had any
interest in the character or pecuniary responsibility of the
plaintiffs, and to those who had no such interest there was no
just occasion or propriety in communicating the information.
The defendants, in making the communication, assumed the
legal responsibility which rests upon all, who, without cause,
publish defamatory matters of others, that is, of proving the
truth of the publication, or responding in damages to the
injured party. The communication of the libel to those not
interested in the information was officious and unauthorized,
although made in the belief of its truth, if it was, in point of
fact, false. In those cases, in which the publications have been
held privileged, the courts have held that there was a reason-
able occasion or exigency, which, for the common convenience
and welfare of society, fairly warranted the communication as
made. But neither the welfare nor convenience of society
will be promoted by bringing a publication of matters, false, in
fact, injuriously affecting the credit and standing of merchants
and traders, broadcast through the land, within the protection
of privileged communications." It will be observed that the
cases cited refer both to civil and criminal proceedings of
slander and libel; and it is immaterial how or in what lan-
guage or signs the information is communicated. In Sz1nder-
fin v. Bradstreet, sap-a, the information was given by printed
signs, and each subscriber had a key to these signs.
The foregoing decisions established the rule that defamatory
matter communicated to the entire membership of the agency,
even though in pursuance of a previous contract, and under
the seal of secrecy, is not privileged; but, if communicated to
members of the agency having a special interest in the person
whom it concerns, if made in good faith and with no inalicions
design, is privileged.
The Supreme Court of Texas has very well stated the gen-
eral ruie and the reason for it. "A commercial agency," said
the court, "'is a lawful business, and when conducted lawfully
is a benefit to society and trade; but no reason can be given
for a rule that would exempt it from liability for false and
defamatory publications when other citizens would not be
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exempt. If an individual, voluntarily or for profit. gives false
and injurious information to persons interested in. the trade
and commercial standing of another at the time the informa-
tion is given, such communication would be privileged; but,
if he furnish the same information to others not interested, to
traders and merchants or a class, the communication would
not be privileged. A commercial agency organized for the
purpose of furnishing such information, keeping an intelligence
office for profit, should, it seems to us, be held to the same
accountability as the ordinary citizen. The acts of the
agency, properly done, are no more meritorious or beneficial
than when done by an individual, except that they may be
more extended and cover more transactions. Impartial jus-
tice cannot imagine a sound reason for a distinction in favor
of an agency. It amounts to this at last and no more. The
business of a commercial agency is lawful when conducted
lawfully: it will be protected so long as it does not transgress
the rights of others. It is not entitled to any privileges
denied the ordinary citizen. If it is a greater benefit to trade
than the occasionable acts of the individual, because more
extended and continuous in its operations, it is for the same
reasons capable of doing more harm by its false reports, its
wrongdoings is more difficult to remedy. Because it has a
monopoly of such intelligence is no reason for giving it a
privilege to do a wrong by an improper publication of false
statements, though the publication may be in the usual course
of the business it has adopted. It has the right then to the
protection of a privileged communication when made to per-
sons at the time interested in the information, even though the
information may be false; but when communicated to its
general subscribers, it has no such right :" Badstrcet Co. v.
Gill, 72 Tex. 15; S. C., 9 S. W. Rep. 753; King v. Patter-
so, 49 N. Y. 417 ; S. C., 9 Atl. Rep. 705: II East. Rep.
325: 6o Am. Rep. 622; S Cent. Rep. 357; 36 Alb. L. Jr.
226; IMoodrui'fv. Bi'ds/r'ct Co., 116 N. Y. 217; S. C., 22
N. E. Rep., affirming 36 Hun. 212 ; Kingsbuw' v. Bradls/r-et
Co., 16 -N. Y.211; S. C., 22 N. E. Rep. 365, affirming 35
Hun. 212 ; E;-bcr"v. Dunn, 12 Fed. Rep. 526; S. C., 4 Mc-
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Crary, 16o ; Tirswell v. Scarlet, IS Fed. Rep. 214; State,
etc. v. Lonsdale, 48 WXis. 348; S. C., 4 N. XV. Rep. 390;
Cook v. Harrington, 3 1 Mo. App. 199 ;fitchell v. Bradstreet
Co., 116 Mo. 226; S. C., 22 S. W. Rep. 358: 2o L. R. Ann,
138; 38 Am. St. Rep, 592 ; Johnson v. Bradstrect Co., 77 Ga.
172; S. C.. 4 Am. St. Rep. 77; 7 S. E. Rep. 867: Pollask,
v. Jhinclhener, 8I Mich. 280; S. C., 21 Am. St. Rep. 516;
46 N. V. Rep. 5.
Special reports volunteered by the agency to its subscribers
having a special interest in such reports, and where there is
just occasion for furnishing them, are privileged, although not
applied for by the subscribers to whom they are furnished
Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 771.
The fact that the agency is under a contract to furnish all
of its subscribers information generally to those who have
a special interest in it as well as to those who have not, is no
defence in an action of libel: King v. Patte-son, supra.
But the defamatory matter is privileged if specially commu-
nicated by a clerk or agent of the defendant; and it need not
be communicated by the proprietor to clothe it with the attri-
butes of privileged communications: Erbe- v. Dunn, sup-a;
King v. Patterson, supra.
The cases of Beardscy v. Tappon, 5 Blatchf. 497: S. C., 10
Vall. 427, on this point cannot be regarded as good law.
See where the case is criticized in the two cases cited above in
this note.
In Marvland it was held that a merchantile agency is not
liable for falsely reporting to its subscribers in a daily notifica-
tion sheet that a certain merchant had executed a chattel
mortgage. This was all there was in the report. '- To ay
or publish of a merchant," said the court. "anything that
imputes insolvency, inability to pay his debts, the want of
integrity in his business, or personal incapacity or pecuniary
inability to conduct it with success, is slanderous or libe!ous
p1.1 se, if without justification, and general damages may be
recovered. Such publication necessarily in legal contei-.pla-
tions, tends to injure the credit and standing of the party to
whom it is made. But we have been referred to no case, and
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have been able to find none in which it has been held, that to
say of a merchant simply that he had made a chattel mortgage
without anything more, as to amount subject to the mortgage,
or the occasion of it, is libelous and slanderous per se, and that
damages therefrom is necessarily inferred. We think no such
legal inference can, in reason, be indulged. Chattel mort-
gages, as well as the pledge of stocks and other securities,
may be made by merchants and others without giving color to
any legal inference or presumption of insolvency or that such
an act will necessarily tend to impair or injure the credit and
standing of the grantor or pledgor. Indeed, we suppose it
would be alarming to merchants and tradesmen to learn other-
wise: Yvewbold v. Bradshrcet. 57 Md. 38; S. C., 40 Am. Rep.
426. See, cont'a, King v. Patterson, sulpra.
In New York, it was held that the court must determine as
a question of law whether or not a published statement that a
judgment had been recovered against a person was libelous
per se. To publish, said the court, of a merchant or trader
that a judgment has been recovered against him is not, in
itself, libelous as an imputation against the soundness of his
financial condition, so as to justify an action without proof of
special damages. The fact that the business of a person
charged with the publication of a libel is t, furnish information
of the pecuniary condition of the persons whose vocations are
such as to be likely to render business credit desirable, will
not give to the mere statement by him of what purports to be
a fact, any other purpose or effect than it expressly or fairly
implies. That its apparent authenticity may be greater, is
immaterial: Ilooduziffv. Bradstrect Co., 35 Hun. 16; affirmed
II6 \. Y. 217.
In an Irish case, the action was for libel in publishing that a
judgment had been rendered against the plaintiff on a certain
day. In fact, the very day it was rendered the plaintiff paid it
off. It was held that there was an actionable libel. This
decision cannot be regarded as good law. The publication
was only of an abstract of a judicial and public record, and
was certainly privileged. There was an absence of malice
and the publication was made under the impression, borne out
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by the record, that the judgment was in force when such pub-
lication was made : i1/cNally v. Old/tam, I6 Irish Rep. C. L.
298.
In a later case it was held that a copy of a judgment pub-
lished in a weekly paper issued in connection with a mer-
cantile agency was a privileged communication. The same
day the judgment was rendered it was paid. Over the protest
of the plaintiff the defendant published the judgment, but
added an asterisk referring to a note in the margin where it
was said, "We are requested to state that the judgment has
been paid." The court sought to distinguish the case from the
case of Jfc.Aally v. Old/tam, on the ground that the facts were
dlfferent; but it is difficult to see in what way the principles
involved are different: Cosgrave v. Tiade Auxillary Co., 8
Irish Rep. 349.
As recent as 1888 it was held to be, in England, a libel to
falsely publish of a trader that a judgment had been rendered
against him, even though the defendants had innocently taken
their information from another trade paper, and the foregoing
cases were commented upon and distinguished : TFlliams v.
Smith, L. R.. 22 0. B. 134; S. C., 58 L. J. Q. B. 21; 59 L.
T. 75 7 ; 3 7 W.R. 9 3 ; 52 J. 
P .82 3 ; 5 L.T.R.2 3 ; 3 9 Alb.
Jr. 247.
It has been held, in an action for falsely publishing that a
judgment had been rendered against the plaintiff, when only a
verdict had been returned against him, it is proper to ask
a witness, who had testified to the effect of such credit, on
cross-examination, whether, if he had known a verdict was
entered instead of a judgment, his conduct would have been
the same. Hessel v. Bradstrect Co., 141 Pa. 5oi ; S. C., 21
Atl. Rep. 65 1.
The mere publication of a notice of foreclosure sale under a
mortgage made by the plaintiff, who is an attorney, engaged
in the real estate business, farming and keeping a hotel, is not
libelous pe-r se, as tending to charge him with insolvency, or
dishonesty, or as affecting his credit. Nor is it injurious to
his reputation as a lawyer, farmer, real estate dealer or hotel-
keeper: Spitnlock v. Lombard fizvestment Co., I Mo. App.
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Reps. 4. A pamphlet issued by the defendant, containing
facts for the guidance of insurance companies in rating
property, gave the plaintiff's name as the owner of several
buildings, and stated that one of the buildings was occupied
as a "blind tiger ;" meaning that it was occupied for the sale
of liquor contrary to law. It was held that the plaintiff could
allege by innuendo that the pamphlet intended to charge him
with operating a blind tiger in such building: SchliLb v.
jaouick (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. Rep. 193.
A judgment was obtined in England against A, as executor
of his deceased father. In registering the judgment in Ireland,
under the Acts of 1868, the judgment was properly described,
but in the Registry of Judgments' office the registered
memorandum by mistake described the judgment as recovered
against A personally, and the particulars of the judgment so
registered were published in the publication known as "Stubbs'
Gazette," which was issued Weekly for the assistance of
bankers, merchants, traders and others against risk and fraud.
In an action for libel brought by A against the proprietors of
the " Gazette," there being no evidence that the defendants
had notice of the error, or acted with malice, it was held that
the publication was privileged, and that the defendants were
entitled to a verdict: Annaly v. Trade Auwiliaiy Co., 26 L.
R. 394, affirming 26 L. R. I I.
In Canada, it has been held that an agency is responsible for
giving persons not interested and making and publishing
reports injurious to the credit of the person complaining:
Bradstrect v. Carsle,, 3 'Montreal, Q. B. 83.
Indeed, the courts of that province have gone farther and
hold that the agency is responsible for the damages caused to
a person in business by an incorrect report made by it con-
cerning his standing, and that such report is not privileged,
though it be only communicated confidentially to a single
subscriber to the agency on his application for information
Dun v. Cossettc, 5 Montreal, 0. B. 42. affirming 3 'Montreal,
S. C. 345 ; See Bradstrect v. Garsh-)', 3 -Montreal, Q. B. 83 ;
Cossette v. Dun, IS Can. S. C. 222 ; The cases, however, are
somewhat controlled-by French law.
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If a subscriberof an agency apply for special information
of a privileged character, and the agency after giving it falsely
denounces the person concerning whom the inquiry is made
as a dishonest person, it will be liable, for such denunciation
is not called for by the inquiry: Brown v. Durham, Tex. Civ.
App., 22 S. W. Rep. 868.
Sec. 6. Blacklisting.
A book, containing a lot of delinquent debtors, is libelous
and not privileged, if it is published by another for distribu-
tion among its members or subscribers, and its manifest pur-
pose is to coerce payment of claims, the name of each delin-
quent being dropped from the list and the fact of hi.; having
made payments announced as soon as it occurred. In an
action by the person thus blacklisted, the plaintiff may show
that he was denied credit by a subscriber to such book, who,
on being asked why he would not credit the plaintiff showed
the book, and gave as his reason for denying the plaintiff
credit, that his name was ther'ein. So sending a letter through
the mail in an envelope on which are printed the name of s:ch
an association, and the statement that it was an organization
for the collection of bad debts is the publication of a libel;
because such words imply that the person addressed is a bad
character and ought not to be credited, and that the corre-
spondence inclosed is for the purpose of collecting from him a
bad debt: Jlztctc, v. Tuteu'r, 77 Wis. 236; S. C., 20 Am. St.
Rep. I T A corporation has the right to publish and cir-
culate among its officers and empioy&s a list of discharged
employ~s, who are considered incompetent or untrustworthy;
and an empoy6 whose name appears upon such list cannot
maintain an action for libel against the corporation in the
absence of proof that the publication was known to be false,
and was actuated by malice : Jlissowui Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rich-
molid, 73 Tex. 568: S.C., 15 Am. St. Rep. 794.
SCc. 7. M71a/icioits Rep ots.
-A statement privileged in the first instance may lose its
privileged character by being reported and persisted in, after
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nowledge of tlhe fact that it is false has been brought home
to its author."' So, too, a commu ication which would, other-
wise, be privileged is not so, if madc with malice, in facts
through 11atre , ill-will and a malicious dsire to injump:
Sber V. Pzm, i z Fed. Rep. .
S.9 a 4efamatory cornucation of an agency to one of its
svbscribers is not privileged, if reasonable care and caution
lyas not exPVcised in co!p cting the inforiatiop, and it iyas
jmparteo to others rec]jpssly an witho.t any reasor to
befieve it true: Zocke V. Bradstreet eo.., 22 Fed. Rep. 77 1,
Bradstel Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. ii5 ; S. C., 9, S. W. Rep. 7$3
Lozv;, v. Vedder, 40 Minn 475 S. C., 42 N. W. Rp. 54-
The burden of propf is upon the agency to show that the
communication is prima face privileged ; but if its privileged
character is showp, then til k, urden is for the plaintiff to slypw
that it was, made with malice in fact : Erbeir v. Dunn, i2 Fed.
Rep. 526; Ormsby v.DozglqsS, 37 N. Y. 4 77.
See. 8. likjzvnction to Restroin the Pblicatioji of Defamatory
Matter.
A mercantile agency cannot be en oined frpm publishing
matter injqri.ps to, and defamatory of, the standing of the
plaintiff ifi the commercial world. In su an nstanc,, if there
he no breach of trust or contract involved, a court of equity
has no jurisoiction : Raymond v. 4zsse4l, 143 Mass. 295 ; S.
C., 58 Am. Rep. 37; 9 N. Y. Rep. 544.
Sec. 9. 7qudlei4 Representation of Merchant to Agency.
If an individual, firm or corporation fraudulently give to an
agency, through its agents, a false report Or statement con-
cerning his own pecuniary responsibility, with the intention to
thereby procure credit, and to thus defraud those who may be
misled into the belief that the representations are true, he will
be liable in an action of deceit to the person defrauded. In
such instance it is immaterial that the false representations
were not made by the defendant directly to the plaintiff, nor
that the defendant did not know when they were made who
might rely and act upon them. "A person furnishing the
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information," said the court, "to such an agency in relation to,
his own circumstances, means and pecunialy responsibility,
can have no other notion in so doing that, to enable the
agency to communicate such information to persons who may
be interested in obtaining it, for their guidance in giving credit
to the party; and if a merchant furnishes to such an agency
a wilful false statement as to his circumstances or pecuniary
ability, with intent to obtain a standing and credit to which he
knows he is not justly entitled, and thus to defraud whoever
may refer to the agency, and in reliance upon the false
information there lodged, extend a credit to him, there is no
reason why his liability to any party defrauded by those
means should not be the same as if he had made the -false
representations directly to the party injured :" Eaton v. Av'ly,.
83 N. Y. 31; S. C., 7 Am. Rep. 389; 18 Hun. 44. False
and fraudulent representations constitute a fraud, and a secret
intention not to profit by them is no defence : 3fo'er v. Let-
terer, so Mo. App. 9,.
Any subscriber of the agency relying upon such false
representations, and selling goods to the person making them,
may rescind the contract and recover possession of them. if
the vendee was insolvent at the time the representations were
made, and when the sale occurred: Gainesville National Bank
v. Bamberger, 77 Tex. 48; S. C., 13 S. W. Rep. 959; 19
Am. St. Rep. 738; Hinchman v. Weeks, 85 Mich. 535; S. C.,
48 N. W. Rep. 790; Gries v. Blackman, 30 Mo. App. 2, 8 ;
Cook v. Harringlot, 31 -Mo. App. 199; Lindauer v. Hay, 6 '
Ia. 667; Canton v. Claflzn, 58 Hun. 6Io; S. C., 12 N. Y.
Supp. 759; 35 N. Y. Rep. 47; Genesee Bank v. Jihchitgaz,
etc., Co., 52 Mich. 164; S. C., 17 N. W. Rep. 790; .27oosey
v. Davis, 75 Mich. 188; S. C., 42 N. Y. Rep. 802; 13 Am.
St. Rep. 425.
In an action for fraud occasioned by the vendee making
false and fraudulent statements to a commercial agency,
whereby he acquires a higher rating than he would have
otherwise obtained, such statements are admissable, if the
vendee relied upon them: Furr, v. O'Connor, I Ind. App..
573; S. C., 28 N. E. Rep. 103.
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This is especially true if the vendee approved such state-
ments after they were put in writing by the agency: Mooney
v. Davis, supra.
But statements made in April cannot be legally regarded as
an assertion of the vendee's financial standing in October or
November following: Hotchkins v. Third National Bank, 57
Hun. 594; S. C., ii N. Y. Supp. 220; 33 N.Y. St. Rep.
195; .otchkins v. J1ration, 58 Hun. 6o6; S. C., i iN.Y.
Supp. 8o6; 34 N. Y. St. Rep. 803; Hinczman v. Wceks, 85
Mich. 535 ; S. C., 48 N. W. Rep. 790; Clajlin v. Flock, 36
N. Y. St. Rep. 728 ; S. C., 13 N. Y. Supp. 269 ; '11cullar v.
MlcKinley, 99 N. Y. 353 ; 49 N. Y. sutpra, 3 ; 2 N. E. Rep. 19.
And so, to, if they were made in February and the sale was
in July of the same year: Tcke,- v. Karples, 88 Mich., 413;
S. C., 5o N. W. Rep. 373.
Reports made six weeks before the sale may be relied on:
Kramer v. Wilson, 20 Mo. App. 173.
Reports not known to the vendor until after the sale are not
admissable to show fraud in an action to recover possession of
the chattels sold: Robinson v. Levi, 81 Ala. 134; S. C., I So.
Rep. 554.
A merchant who has made a report to an agency is not
bound to notify it of a change for the worse in his affairs,
unless he has become insolvent, or-is in such a condition as to
be aware that he will be obliged to suspend. And if he has
made subsequent reports showing a decrease in his financial
standing, a subscriber to the agency cannot rely alone on the
original report, but must consider all the reports together
which were rendered before the sale was made: Cortand Ins.
Co. v. Platt, 83 Mich. 419; S. C., 47 N. W. Rep. 330; Moe ,
v. Davis, supra.
The fact that before the vendor acted upon the false state-
ments of the vendee, the latter had refused to give another
statement of ois condition called for by the agency, and which
was not communicated to the vendor, does not effect the right
to rescind the contract for misrepresentations, for in the absence
of a recall, the original statement is a continuing one: Claflln
v. Flack, 36 N. Y. St. Rep. 728; S. C., 13 N. Y. supra, 269.
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The agent of the agency may testify how the business of
the agency was transacted, and the plaintiff may show that he
refused to make the sale, until the report of the agency con-
cerning the vendee's financial standing was furnished him:
Hinchman v. Weeks, 85 Mich. 535 ; S. C., 48 N. W. Rep.
790.
But where the only representations made are those fur-
nished to the seller by the agency, it must be clearly shown
that the accused buyer made the statements to the agency
with the fraudulent intent to use the agency as an instrument
to accomplish a fraud upon his vendor or some other dealer:
Victor v. Hcnlien, 33 Hun. 549 ; S. C., 7 Civ. Pro. Rep. 67;
I How. Pr. (N. S.), 159 ; Deickerhoffv. Brown (Md.), 2 Cent.
Rep. 620.
This point is very well illustrated by a New York case. In
February, upon application of the agency, a tailor reported
that he had a stock on hand of $25oo, and no liabilities, "as
I pay cash for all my purchases." He in fact owed $2000
for borrowed money. In June he refused to make another
report to the agency. In August the plaintiff solicited him to
purchase goods and offered him "long time." Other orders
were given by the defendant to the plaintiff in September and
October. The February report showed that the defendant
had once failed in business three or four years before, and had
settled with his creditors at fifty cents on the dollar; that he
had little business, his wife supporting the family, and there
was an entry on the books of the company that he refused to
give a report in June with the statement that he was regarded
as of little responsibility. It was held that there was no evi-
dence to show an intent to mislead or deceive the plaintiff, and
that there was no fraud or false representations, inducing him
to make the sale. "The statement of February was not made
as a basis of credit. On the contrary, he says, ' I pay cash
for all my purchases,' implying thereby, 'I ask no credit.' He
did not claim to be desirous of any. Had he then asked for
credit it would have been natural and becoming in the one
applied to to have made further inquiry. As it is the credit
seems to have been thrust upon, not obtained by him. In all
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this there is no excuse for non-payment, but every reason why
the debtor should not suffer in this action like a criminal or as
for a tort:" 213aculfar v. JfcKinley, 99 N. Y. Rep. 9 ; S. C.,
2 N. E. Rep. 19, affirming 49 N. Y., szpra, 3.
Scc. to. Interstate Conzmerce.
A law of a state requiring a commercial agency of another
state to take out a license for each of the agents doing busi-
ness in any country of the state, and to pay a fee therefor, and
deposit a certain sum of money as a security for those with
whom it transacts business in the state, is not in contravention
of the Constitution of the United States, nor is such an agency
engaged in interstate commerce: State v. Morgan (S. D.), 48
N. W. Rep. 314.
Sec. ii. Service of Process.
A statute of Texas provided that service of process could
be made upon the agent of a foreign corporation doing busi-
ness within the state. Under this statute it was held that pro-
cess could be served upon an agent who sometimes furnished
a commercial agency with statement of the business standing
of merchants within the country: Bradstreet Co. v. Gill,
sup ra.
W. W. THORNTON.
Indianapolis, mnd., Nov. 20, r895.
